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Abstract 
This study is situated at the intersection of fake news and the daily news production 
practices of mainstream media journalists in Zimbabwe during the November 2017 ‘soft 
coup’. There is a paucity of research on journalists’ responses to fake news, during 
military coups, despite increasing research on the influence of fake news on traditional 
news production practices. Conceptualised on social organisation of news work, the study 
deploys qualitative interviews with purposively selected political reporters from 
mainstream daily newspapers, to explore how they responded to fake news during the 
coup. The study found out that faced with an avalanche of fake news, journalists 
responded by re-evaluating their news sourcing routines and engaged in collective efforts 
to identify sources and pressure points of fake news that interfered with their work. Yet, 
overt reliance on unreliable websites and social media sources to produce news still 
persisted. Based on this and other related findings, we recommend that journalists should 
evolve their own platforms and mechanisms to verify and challenge fake news prevalent 
on social media and websites. We further recommend a “triangular approach” that can, 
in the long term, reduce the influence of fake news. 
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The Zimbabwe coup of November 2017 
On the 14th of November 2017, the Zimbabwe National Army moved into the streets of the 
capital city, Harare. Within hours, they had occupied the country’s main government buildings 
and the sole public broadcaster – the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC). The 
following day, the man referred to as “the face of the coup”, Brigadier Sibusiso Moyo, 
announced the military take-over. The army officially called their move “Operation Restore 
Legacy”. In his announcement, Brigadier Moyo emphasised that the army was not undertaking 
a coup. According to Brigadier Moyo, this was a “bloodless correction” targeted at criminals 
surrounding the president (Mugabe), not the president himself”. Brigadier Moyo specifically 
said, “We wish to make it abundantly clear that this is not a military takeover […] we are 
targeting criminals around Mugabe who are committing crimes that are causing social and 
economic suffering in the country in order to bring them to justice” (Moyo 2017: 1). The 
Zimbabwe coup has often been regarded as an enigma (Mackintosh 2017). For a fact, it was 
bloodless and non-violent (Mackintosh 2017). Huntington (2006) would call this a “soft coup”. 
It does not neatly sync into the categories of “generic” military coups because there are no 
reported or recorded incidences of violence and deaths that characterise military coups 
(Huntington 2006). Despite all these, it still deposed a civilian president, and still constitutes a 
collapse of military power into civilian political spaces leading to the deposition of civilian 
authority. Therefore, because of such consequences, it should be seen as a military coup.  
One major characteristic of a coup is that it generates a lot of news (Srivastava 2016). An 
enduring feature of this period, from 14 November when the army moved into the streets, to 
the 21st of November when Robert Mugabe resigned, was an avalanche of fake news around 
the events of that week. Fake news emanated from social media platforms and websites that 
mimicked established mainstream newspapers. Some of these websites seemed to have 
sprouted sphinx-like, to cover the political events as they unfolded in the country. For example, 
at one time, it was reported that the Presidential Guard commanded by Brigadier Anselem 
Sanyatwe had refused to back down to senior military command, paving the way for a bloody 
showdown. Other websites reported that Mugabe had ordered the army back to barracks and 
senior military officials arrested. In other websites, Mugabe was reported executed by his 
guards and his whole family was being held captive. On some social media platforms and 
websites, party members opposed to the coup, like the then Minister of Information, Jonathan 
Moyo, were reported killed. Other sources claimed that there were military commanders who 
had vowed to defend Mugabe. There was also a story on social media and websites that former 
army commander, Retired General Solomon Mujuru, who died in an inferno in 2011, was after 
all, alive, leading the coup. In all this razzmatazz, the only ‘truth’ was that Mugabe’s 
relationship with his erstwhile allies both in the army and party had irrevocably broken down, 
with the possibility of a bloody showdown, either one had to give way to the other to avoid a 
violent confrontation. 
New online news platforms that emerged became conduits of fake news that the mainstream 
press had to fiercely contest with in the dissemination of news about the coup. Online fake 
news platforms have many characteristics, chief amongst them being that it is difficult to trace 
their origin (Reveal 2016).  They also do not have visible owners who associate themselves 
with such platforms especially when they are websites (Martens et al. 2018). During the coup 
in Zimbabwe, such platforms included, Zimbabwe is back; Zim patriots, The insider. Another 
characteristic of fake news platform is that they are event driven – disappearing after an event. 
In Zimbabwe, many platforms that propagated fake news during the coup disappeared after the 
coups, possibly because the volume of traffic to their sites had tremendously declined. Even   
(Mackintosh 2017), speaking to the BBC admitted that during the coup in Zimbabwe, it was 
difficult to know who to believe. 
A military coup generates uncertainty about the unfolding events and the means and 
motivations of actors (El- Erin 2016). In a world of rapid and de-institutionalised information 
production and dissemination, fake news influences how a coup is understood, interpreted and 
reported on by journalists (Srivastava 2016). One journalist said it was a “moment of madness” 
for the mainstream media. They did not know which news was true, or which sources were 
reliable, and above all, how to react to the rampant fake news which the public were fed with 
on a daily basis. In this paper, we seek journalists’ responses to fake news during the coup. We 
seek to answer the questions: In what ways did fake news affect their own news production 
practices? How did journalists respond to fake news during the coup? Were their responses to 
fake news effective to combating fake news? What can be done, going forward, to adequately 
respond to the scourge of fake news in moments of crisis like the coup in Zimbabwe? 
Literature review: Fake news in contemporary news discourses  
Fake news has become very popular and much discussed in present day news and media 
debates.  Even in laymen conversations about the believability of news, fake news has become 
a major referent point. Defining fake news is contentious considering that there is no 
universally acknowledged body of truths. There are arguments that if it is fake, then it cannot 
be news (Kupe 2019). Thus, from this perspective, it means the phrase ‘fake news’ is 
oxymoronic. The application of the term fake news in many different contexts (Baron and 
Crootof 2018) has further muddled the conceptualisation of an agreed definition of fake news 
in news scholarship. Generally, fake news refers to “viral posts based on fictitious accounts 
made to look like news reports” (Tandoc et al 2018: 3). Alcott and Gentzkow (2017: 213) 
define fake news as “news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false and could mislead 
readers”. Tandoc et al (2018) note that early definitions of fake news discerned it as a 
phenomenon that included news parodies, news propaganda and political satire amongst other 
issues. In other scholarship, fake news has been understood within the sphere of disinformation 
and misinformation (Wardle 2017). Disinformation is a variation of fake news (Patterson 
2016). This is because disinformation is misleading information intentionally spread 
(Patterson). Misinformation on the other hand, is unintentional spread of information that is 
still untrue, and can deceive (Fallis 2015). Fake news, arguably, encompasses both 
disinformation and misinformation because both produce the same result, untrue information.  
The motivations for spreading fake news have been as controversial as the definition of fake 
news itself. Tandoc et al (2018) and Alcott and Gentzkow (2017) argue that the motivations 
for fake news are financial and ideological. Braun and Eklund (2018: 4) agree that financial 
gains are the main motivations for fake news, more than any other reason. In relation to the 
2016 USA elections they argue that, “…some of the individuals publishing 
these stories made substantial sums of money from their efforts, with a number claiming 
revenues of 10,000 to 30,000 USD per month at the height of their work’s popularity…” As 
fake news spreads, they do provide hosts with clicks that are convertible to advertising revenue 
(Braun and Eklund 2018). Fake news can also be spread by providers who are interested in 
discrediting others and promoting particular views (Tandoc et al 2018).  
The growing stream of fake news has made it hard to keep track of what is happening around 
the world.  More so, it has created a crisis of credibility for mainstream news providers who 
have to grapple with “deepfakes”, disinformation, misinformation, and extremely partisan 
content, fearmongering headlines shared on the many media platforms like WhatsApp, 
Snapchat, Instagram, web-based news sites and other spaces (Lopez 2016). Once-trusted 
mainstream news institutions have to deal with an avalanche of fake news and this has triggered 
‘a crisis of believability’ – what should people believe? Fallis (2015) argues that fake news 
cannot be separated from the media technology in which the culture grows. This somehow 
reflects McLuhan’s (2004) assertion that the medium is the message. Hence, the argument by 
some scholars (e.g. Fallis 2015) is that the problem of fake news is basically a problem of 
communication technology, which has made the spread of fake news rapid. But, what can 
technology, including the gadgets, do without the people? Some (see Mina 2019: 3) have 
referred to this crisis of believability as signalling “the death of consensus, and a broader 
transition to a world of dissensus nudged along by a variety of media outlets”. Thus, in a way, 
fake news has instigated a crisis in mainstream journalism practices by casting doubt on 
primary news sources material that used to be believable. Silverman and Pham (2018: 1) argue 
that “altered news stories, videos, lip-synced expressions, face swaps and many other creations 
of fake news have created deep distrust in mainstream journalism.” To buttress the point, 
Silverman and Pham (2018) note that in 2018 alone, fake news stories in the USA were shared 
on Facebook 22 million times. A Pew Research Centre Report (2016) has shown that a true 
story takes six times as long as a fake news story to reach about 1 500 people. The same 
research has shown that bots accelerate the spread of fake news lesser than true news, thus 
demonstrating that fake news spreads because it is shared more by people than robots. 
Scott and Eddy (2017), Tandoc et al (2018) and Lopez (2016) note the most common types of 
fake news. Mis-appropriation is one common variation of fake news (Tandoc et al 2018). This 
is the use of a non-manipulated image taken out of its original context to represent a different 
context (Tandoc et al 2018). The image itself may be factual, but when it is misappropriated, 
it is used to support a fake and concocted discourse. News fabrication is another common thread 
of fake news (Lopez 2016). These are stories with no factual basis but are written as news 
articles to create legitimacy (Tandoc et al 2018). Photo manipulation is another method by 
which fake news spread. This implies the use of real images or videos to create a false narrative 
about an event. It is a common occurrence with new technologies, powerful image 
manipulation devices and software, digital photos and many other such techniques. Other forms 
of fake news include false context- genuine content shared with false context; hoaxes, 
disinformation and propaganda targeting users already in conversation about the news issue. 
Every discussion of fake news raises important questions around how we should think about 
the nature of real news (Lopez 2016; Scott and Eddy 2017; Tandoc et al 2018). Baym (2005: 
261) further asserts that, “fake news necessitates assumptions about some kind of authentic or 
legitimate set of news practices”. News, often, is an output of journalism (Campbell 1997; 
Kovach and Rosenstiel 2007). News is expected “to be independent, reliable, accurate and 
comprehensive” (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2007: 11). A central element of news is the 
professionalism of journalism (Schudson 2003). In addition, objectivity and accuracy of news 
remain its core elements (Kershner 2005). Along these comes power – the influential position 
of the journalist in society – for example, conferring or amplifying legitimacy to powerful 
authorities. This does not mean journalists are objective all the time. News is a social 
construction (Tuchman 1978), and thus, journalists’ own preferences, government and state 
influence, advertisers’ preference are sometimes inflected in the news. It is important to 
highlight that scholars of fake news (see Wardle; Baron and Crootof 2018; Braun and Eklund 
2018; Briant 2018) agree that the scourge of fake news in contemporary news dissemination 
represents the increased weaponisation of technology to attack the institutions of media- 
especially news as an important conduit of information dissemination. Bearing all these 
arguments in mind, this article examines fake news in the context of a fast-developing event- 
a coup, and how mainstream press journalists who reported the coup responded in the face of 
an avalanche of fake news which competed with their mainstream news stories about the coup. 
We examine, further, the extent to which mainstream journalists think fake news altered their 
news-gathering and reporting practices.  
Conceptual framework: Social organisation of newswork 
The study is anchored in the concept of the sociology of news production as articulated by 
Schudson (1989; 2000). Of the three approaches to the study of news production, that is, 
political economy, sociological, and culturological, the study utilises the theoretical lenses of 
the sociological view. This view “questions journalists’ professional autonomy and decision- 
making power and tries to understand how journalists’ efforts on the job are constrained by 
occupational and organisational routines” (Schudson 1989: 266). It recognises, as did Weber, 
that journalists are political beings (Schudson 1989).  
This view recognises that news is a constructed reality in which journalists as professionals 
play a role in interpreting everyday events to the public (Tuchman 1978; Gans 1979). Thus, it 
was the duty of journalists to ‘interpret’ the fast-moving events during the coup. However, it 
must be taken into account that as much as journalists use their professional practices to 
interpret events for the public, these practices also serve organisational needs (Tuchman 1978.) 
Furthermore, journalistic practices are also shaped by forces outside the news organisation 
(Gans 1979). Thus, journalists’ output - the news - must be seen to give a picture of events and 
the community/country in which they happen (Gans 1979). This picture is consequently shaped 
by various influences including the journalists, organisations they work for and forces outside 
these organisations such as sources and socio-politico-economic conditions obtaining. 
Early studies of news production emphasised the influence of organisational needs on the news 
product (Epstein 1973; Tuchman 1978; Gans 1979; Fishman 1980). Epstein (1973) argued that 
in spite of journalists having some shared professional values in relation to what constitutes 
news, these values have to be subservient to the needs and logic of the organisation they work 
for. When an event occurs, journalists choose to select or ignore aspects of the event based on 
the values of their news organisation, rather than their own deep-seated beliefs or ideologies. 
Tuchman (1978: 4) argues that “news is located, gathered, and disseminated by professionals 
working in organisations. Thus, it is inevitably a product of newsworkers drawing upon 
institutional processes and conforming to institutional practices.” From this perspective it is 
the organisation that stands prominently in the making of news even though there is a 
recognition that journalists follow some professional values. In a study on fake news and 
journalists’ responses to it, taking this perspective leads us to the ways in which organisational 
routines were tweaked or remained unchanged in trying to deal with the rampant propagation 
of fake news during the fast-moving events of the coup.  
The emphasis on organisational routines as the key determinant of the news product inevitably 
leads to a perspective that emphasises an overreliance by journalists on a few elite sources so 
that they can be able to meet organisational deadlines and preferred narratives. The result is 
that there is a consistent representation of a fairly small group of actors and their activities in 
the news (Gans 1979). Consequently, the values that appear in the news are not necessarily 
those of journalists but are often shared by the frequently represented sources. Journalists are 
also constrained by professional imperatives where values such as objectivity and truthfulness 
lead them to rely on ‘credible’ sources (see Reich 2011). Sonbely (2015: 264) notes that from 
the early researches on news production, professionalism meant and continues to mean 
“knowing the details of bureaucratic routines, knowing sources within government institutions, 
and knowing which information editors wanted from observation of these institutions’ daily 
work”. To capture this argument, Gans (1979: 80) gives a definition of news as “information 
which is transmitted from sources to audiences, with journalists who are both employees of 
bureaucratic commercial organisations and members of a profession, summarising, refining, 
and altering what becomes available to them from sources in order to make the information 
suitable for their audiences”. 
However, according to Cottle (2000; 2007) these arguments by what he calls ‘first wave’ 
researchers in news production, downplay the agency of individual journalists in news making. 
There is need to recognise that journalists are more consciously involved in the production of 
news While acknowledging that organisational control and other outside forces influence the 
practice of journalism, “there is need for a more discursive appreciation of human agency and 
meanings within prevailing administrative procedures and/or regimes of truth” (Cottle 2007: 
22). There has been an increase in the number of studies that acknowledge the agency of 
journalists (see Ryfe 2009; Usher 2012). A study such as this one may be able to unpack some 
of the subjective practices that journalists engaged in during a potential news event. By 
inquiring from the journalists themselves, it is possible to peek into these subjectivities apart 
from the organisational imperatives which also come out in journalists’ narrations of how they 
dealt with the scourge of fake news in a fast-moving, high-risk national security event.  
Methodology 
The data analysed in this research draws from in-depth interviews conducted in selected 
mainstream press newsrooms in Zimbabwe. The interview findings are presented thematically. 
Braun and Clarke (2006: 79) define thematic analysis as: “A method for identifying, analysing 
and reporting patterns within data”. It is preferred here because it provides a rich, complex and 
detailed description of the data that will be analysed. Thus, each emerging theme will be 
established from the data and interviewees’ responses discussed under the theme. In total we 
interviewed nine journalists from three different newspaper sites. These nine journalists were 
tasked specifically with covering the unfolding coup and updating the online stories for their 
particular newspapers. Three were from The Daily News, a private daily newspaper, three from 
Newsday, another privately-owned daily and the last three were from The Herald, a public-
owned but state-controlled daily newspaper. We offered our respondents an option to remain 
anonymous in published accounts of this paper as many of them had requested it. Their 
argument was that some of the information they would divulge was professionally sensitive. 
The article also draws from examples of fake news that widely circulated during the coup. The 
intention of the paper is to explore how mainstream journalists responded to widespread fake 
news that circulated during the coup. Therefore interviews with mainstream journalists suffice 
for this research.  
Findings 
In the different newsrooms, we noted that while journalists never had a coordinated, 
“universally” agreed upon approach to dealing with fake news, their responses were almost 
similar when dealing with fake news. We note that largely, these journalists responded by 
rethinking news sourcing routines and identifying and exposing fake news players and pressure 
points, among various responses we noted. 
Rethinking news sourcing routines in the face of fake news onslaught. 
Journalists asserted that “rules of thumb” – where old and elite sources were trusted and 
considered reliable no longer applied, as they proved to be infected. Old sources had to be 
doubted, as they had become purveyors of fake news in some instances. New ones had to be 
cultivated. Journalists said during this moment, they started to move away from well-cultivated 
elite sources of news, as they started to be less-reliable news providers about the coup. Elite 
sources are those news sources that are close to power and other institutions, like government, 
party and military spokespersons (Mason 2007). An advantage of elite sources is their 
trustworthiness (Phillips 2010), and that they are often regarded as “safe sources” (Phillips 
2010). Another advantage is that elite sources have an assuring proximity to power (Cottle 
2000) and carry “institutional status” (Carlson 2009). Fake news, according to these journalists, 
had eroded trust in these sources, and dictated a rethink of the use of these sources. One 
interviewed journalist said, “The danger was that during the coup, fake news devalued and 
delegitimised the sources we used to rely on. Even the voices of experts, authoritative 
institutions sounded fake”. This had two major consequences according to journalists. Firstly, 
source credibility, an important validating aspect of news was devalued. Secondly, the ability 
of people to engage in rational debates about the coup based on shared facts was undermined 
as disinformation outflanked the facts. One journalist noted, “I think as a citizen, I had no idea 
how to feel about Mugabe. We did not know exactly what was happening to him. At one time 
other sites were saying he had been deposed quietly and an announcement was due. Suddenly, 
some websites reported that he was actually planning a counter-push against his erstwhile 
allies, and everyone who had celebrated his predicament”.  Another one noted, “We were 
grappling with the question of Mugabe’s fate every day in the newsroom. Every site was 
reporting quite differently. It was bad for us that we could not set an agenda for the readers”. 
An editor for one of the papers, retorted, “On the second day of the coup (the 18th of November) 
we toyed (sic) with an idea of running two daily editions for continuous updates to our 
readers… but then the problem was not where will we get the news, but whether we will get 
reliable information… we then thought, there was just too much fake news and a second daily 
edition might actually implicate us in this maze (sic) of fake news and kill our reputation…” 
In the instance of the Zimbabwe coup, therefore, fake news sites “borrowed” the authority of 
the mainstream platforms and even surpassed them in “news production”, and, simultaneously, 
fake news platforms undermined these platforms. For example, the story that Mugabe’s bullet-
riddled body had been discovered in his blue-roof house circulated on faster than journalists 
could refute it. These fake news platforms consequently undermined the effectiveness and 
visibility of the mainstream as gatekeepers and mutilated the institutional authority that 
mainstream news institutions are supposed to possess. One journalist noted that in their 
newsroom, the two journalists tasked to cover the rapidly developing story exercised what he 
called “news source fragmentation”. “Before we published any of the stories, we had to 
corroborate given information with other related sources… for example, in the same office 
where we would have got the information, we could inquire with two or more people to check 
if the same information could be ascertained…” This seemed to be fact-checking which is a 
normal journalistic practice. But the journalist insisted it was different in many ways from what 
they used to do. “We never used to do this. We usually got our stories right even by consulting 
one source at a place at a time…” Another interviewee said, “We no longer trusted these 
sources. We were even skeptical of military sources even though we knew they were the ones 
that mattered during such an event…” Why were mainstream press journalists skeptical about 
military sources at a moment they had assumed legendary importance? A respondent said, “Our 
suspicion was that there were just too many military sources claiming knowledge of what was 
happening. We also suspected that there was a danger that we could be fed with 
disinformation… you know our relationship with power has always been frosty… So had to be 
skeptical about every source in the era of fake news…” Another journalist agreed, “Coming 
from the private press, we were no longer sure if the military was not deliberately misleading 
us because of previous criticism we had levelled against them. In my newsroom, we even 
suspected the army was deliberately fomenting speculation, feeding fake news spaces with fake 
news in order to distract the formation of a fact-based public narrative on the coup…” 
From respondents’ perspective, fake news websites stories seemed to align neatly with the 
ruling party’s factional politics. Journalists noted that fake stories were either pro-coup or anti-
coup. For example, on the morning of the 19th of November, two days before the resignation 
of Robert Mugabe from the presidency, there were two contradictory fake news stories. One 
story that went viral was that Chiwenga, the then commander of the Zimbabwe military, had 
been arrested by his own fellow commanders, and the coup had been halted. The story gained 
credence because it was originally peddled by a website that had been used frequently used by 
ZANU PF youths for communication- Zim patriots. The problem with this website is not only 
that it circulated fake news, but that it mimicked the design of an authentic website with the 
same name.  Another fake story that simultaneously went viral was that Mugabe had sworn in 
the then Minister of Defence, Sydney Sekeramayi, as president. Both stories turned out to be 
fake news. This story circulated on a newly found website Zim is back – which also had a 
twitter handle to that name - #Zimisback. 
Other journalists also said they had to rely on what they called “safe news” sources and scaled 
down on speculative stories for fear of being trapped in fake news. “We had to depend on “safe 
news” like press statements issued by authorities and other competing organisations and 
players”. In other newsrooms, journalists said more financial resources had to be allocated to 
follow up on credible sources. “We had to make sure we are not caught in the web of fake news 
that characterised the coup and for the first time, our management sent more reporters out to 
verify news and this was costly. We had never found ourselves in such a situation before. This 
was costly in my view, but had to be done…” But, there were many challenges associated with 
this approach as noted by one journalist. He said, “Credible sources were ever-diminishing… 
but the more they diminished the more we felt a heavy responsibility to debunk disinformation. 
Secondly, the financial resources to devote for such an endeavor were diminishing 
too…remember our newsrooms have never been properly funded…” This was done, in the 
interest of separating credible mainstream news from a ubiquitous concoction of fake news that 
characterised events leading to Mugabe’s removal from power. As Goldberg (2018) asserts, 
accuracy is a critical dimension of information quality. 
No substitute for traditional journalism 
In the face of a decline in the availability of credible sources, journalists quickly realised that 
basics of the profession would carry the day. There was a realisation that there was a high risk 
of ending up being lumped together with those disseminating fake news. Editors went into high 
alert mode. One editor stated that, “we realised there was a deep hunger for information and 
many people were looking to us to provide accurate information. So we still had to rely on 
traditional ways of gathering information. This would separate us from the ubiquitous fake 
news circulating at that time.”  
Instead of going with the flow, some editors created small teams to work on the moving events 
of the coup. This was meant to ensure that only experienced and reliable personnel worked on 
the sensitive aspects of the coup. Some editors had sources privy to information of a high 
security nature, so they decided to work with only small teams since there was no certainty as 
to which direction things would go in the beginning. One stated that “I could get events in real 
time including where the coup was being cooked…I got a call around 2.30am telling me what 
to do. I had access to information that I have never shared with anyone…During the period 
from Monday to Wednesday I had my core team of reporters. I could not work with everyone 
else. I would tell them that now I want you to focus on a particular area…I was getting 
information from people close to both the former and current president.” It has been argued 
that the journalist’s most important tool of the trade is sources (Tuchman 1978; Gans 1979; 
Schudson 1989; Ryfe 2009). The editor stated that his tight control of the flow of information 
was to guard against unreliable sources spreading believable but fake stories. For example, 
journalists intimated that one of the fast-circulating fake news was that the former first lady, 
Grace had escaped to Mozambique that night, and that former ministers, Saviour Kasukuwere 
and Jonathan Moyo had been arrested in a night raid at Mugabe’s residence. “It was a 
whirlwind of news that we found difficult to deal with” admitted one journalist from Newsday. 
As it turned out, the ministers were never arrested during the coup and the former first lady 
never crossed into Mozambique. 
Having sources at this time proved to be valuable capital for those in the business of news. 
Journalists with sources in Robert Mugabe’s inner circle and in the military’s top echelons 
became reference points for other journalists regardless of media houses they worked for. One 
journalist bragged that “we were there when things happened. Some reporters went into hiding 
and I was one of those that did not go into hiding, I had journalists from other media houses 
asking me what was happening because I had access to both the former and incoming 
president.” Hence Tuchman (1978: 69) argues that “the higher the status of sources and the 
greater the scope of their positions, the higher the status of the reporters.” Bourdieu (1986) 
calls this capital – the experience, credible sources and prestige that journalists bring with them 
into the newsroom. This also serves to highlight that journalists are not bound captive by the 
rules and needs of their organisations. “If reporters were merely bureaucratic employees 
operating according to the rules and needs of their organisation, they might be expected to 
hoard information from reporters working for competing media and share with all reporters of 
their own company. Instead exercising their autonomy, they may share with competitors and 
hoard information from other bureaus within their own organisation” (Tuchman 1978: 74). 
Those with the best sources gain respect not only in their newsroom, but within the community 
of journalists (Ryfe 2009). 
While there was an intense proliferation of unverified news during the coup, traditional media 
remained the go-to place for credible news. This, according to the journalists, placed them in a 
better place among the audiences, some of whom were not always convinced by what they read 
on social media. A journalist stated that “we don’t talk to virtual but real people…we knew 
there were many people who relied on social media, so we had an easily accessible website 
where they could get credible news. Our Twitter handle and Facebook page directed people to 
the website.” However, the journalist acknowledged that fake news remained popular. He 
stated that “fake news has become popular because they are not accountable to anyone unlike 
us. Guys who create fake news actually get our stories and twist them because there is usually 
some aspect of truth in fake news, it’s big money hence all these websites are sprouting.” 
The key issue for journalists was not getting information about the coup. Rather it was verifying 
that information. Journalists agreed that there was a lot of information circulating on social 
media such that they were now relying on social media to get hints about what was going on. 
In fact, as it became difficult for some to get information through official channels, social media 
became an important source of information. However, for them finding information was the 
easy part. The difficult part was being able to verify the information that they were getting. 
One journalist noted that “there was massive intimidation to journalists. For example, we were 
told not to touch on military personnel, so we had to rely on social media to get the information 
then had to find ways of verifying the information.” When asked how exactly they verified the 
information the journalist stated that “the challenge was on the ordinary journalist, only the 
editor was the leader at this time, we would get a developing story and the editor would help 
get it flesh.” Thus, traditional ways of verifying sources became necessary probably more than 
before. For example, respondents noted that a developing story that the police support unit had 
been disarmed as coup plotters were afraid of its perceived loyalty to former president Mugabe 
was difficult to verify. Interviewees admitted that it was not easy to get a well-placed source to 
verify yet the story was making headlines on some websites. However, journalists noted the 
story proved fake as the support unit was deployed into the streets alongside the army. 
Mainstream press goes to war: Identifying and exposing fake news players and pressure 
points.  
Journalists interviewed said another newsroom response was identifying the main fake news 
sites which were the main purveyors of fake news. This was a proactive exposure of fake news 
sites – websites, Twitter accounts and Facebook pages that were notorious for spreading fake 
news about the coup. One journalist said, “We had to speak back and expose those sites. We 
did not want to be lumped in with all the garbage (sic) news about the coup… it’s frustrating.” 
Another journalist agreed, “We had to strenuously pursue the real story about the coup, check 
the facts … putting out quality journalism… and in the process we were exposing those who 
were spreading fake news…” The argument by journalists was that fake news websites and 
social media platforms were harming the efforts they were putting in producing fact- based 
news, the bedrock of solid journalism.  
In a way, this was a response to the realisation by mainstream journalists that they were no 
longer the bona fide filters of news. Citizens now had to be the final arbiters of news, in the 
face of fake news. Thus, by taking head-on the purveyors of fake news, journalists were 
fighting back to regain their powers, compromised by these platforms.  Another journalist said 
thus, “Exposing fake websites and fake twitter accounts became part of our social 
responsibility. We realised that disinformation and exaggerations were driving the political 
situation to near-hysteria”. But exposing these spaces was no mean task. One journalist said, 
“Of course, we had to be careful in exposing these spaces of fake news… our battles against 
fake news had to be chosen carefully. Some of them had reached levels of believability amongst 
the public. They were now seen as credible sources of the coup and subsequent developments. 
We, therefore, had to invest more in the way we explained these websites as fake news at a 
time they had already assumed a sense of believability…” 
 “We had to identify them, and discredit them. We cannot really say there was a cross-
newsroom agreement on this. It was a spontaneous, almost natural reaction by some of us. We 
realised that fake news sources purporting to be newspapers were eating into credibility and 
the trust we so desperately wanted to retain”. Journalists said they had to first identify the fake 
news players and isolate them. This, according to them, was very important in determining 
where not to get news. “We realised that the more news we got about the coup, the more fake 
it was...once we realised the danger of seriously harming our reputation and trust that we had 
so strenuously cultivated over the years, we realised we had to speak back to fake news by 
informing our readers the difference between us as professional news organisations and fly-by-
night news platforms…”.  Another journalist added, “We had to debunk outrightly, false tweets 
and websites with misleading stories as we covered our own stories… websites were easy to 
speak back to… we would just refute their stories right away in our own coverage…”.  This 
seems a desperate effort, considering that fake news mutates from platform to platform. Pellotti 
(2018) succinctly puts it, “We now inhabit a world with computational propaganda, state-
sponsored, “sock-pupper networks”, troll armies and technology that can mimic legitimate 
news websites and seamlessly manipulate audio and video to create synthetic representations 
of number of sources…” Hence, it would seem a hopeless endeavor to fight against rampant 
intentional, commercial and ideological disinformation. 
More so, exposing fake news, or “speaking back” as respondents preferred to call it, appeared 
to be a problematic response in the sense that it is not easy to identify the source of fake news 
(Tandoc et al 2018). Respondents from The Daily News noted that they, for example, exposed 
the lie on a newly created website, Zimpatriots that the then police commander, Augustine 
Chihuri had been arrested. “One journalist said, “We checked our sources and we were told 
Chihuri was actually in a meeting with other security service chiefs”. This means some of the 
fake news purveyors did not go unchecked. The strategy also raises the question of whether 
unmasking these platforms of fake news really lessened both the production and spread of fake 
news about the coup. New platforms would always emerge, still motivated by profit or 
ideology, or both (White 2001). Thus, beneficiaries of fake news would evolve newer platforms 
to spread it. Yet, in a way, exposing fake news, was a useful starting point. One journalist said, 
“At one point, we had teams in the newsrooms that looked at sites reporting the coup and 
assessing trendy information. We would then give out information about fake news sites to our 
readers on our own websites”.  Another interviewee attested, “Our suspicion was that some of 
the fake news was coming from senior ruling party (ZANU PF) officials aligned to either of 
the party’s many factions and from some deceptive actors motivated by profit… so we had a 
real fight on our hands as their information sounded juicy…” Journalists, however admitted 
that they really did not have evidence of this alignment, it was a mere suspicion. The same 
strategy is questionable from other fronts. For example, while we acknowledge that exposing 
fake news sites helped the public in ascertaining who and what to believe, we should equally 
accept that this would not improve the quality of news in the mainstream press, nor restore the 
loss of trust the mainstream media has suffered as a result of fake news proliferation. It should 
also be acknowledged that this response is positive in the sense that it is a journalist-led 
initiative rather than a state-led initiative. The spreading of fake news is a deplorable vice. But, 
the interference of governments and state in the regulation of content would always be viewed 
as undesirable. 
Discussion 
We have noted that journalists, as much as they wanted to be “liberated” from potentially 
infected sources, still found themselves, ironically tied to these sources. They, in many 
respects, however, attempted to muster a response to fake news by rethinking their sourcing 
routines and “fighting” fake news through naming and shaming well-documented platforms of 
such. This response was, however, not enough in the long term. Fighting fake news requires a 
three-pronged approach, or what we call a “triangular approach” to the scourge. Firstly, there 
is need for journalists to strengthen the norms of professional journalism if they are to fight 
fake news adequately. Secondly, there is greater need, more than ever, for greater newsroom 
collaboration, and lastly, newsrooms need to deepen investigative approaches to news 
production.  
The “triangular approach” to fighting fake news we propose involves three pillars: a 
collaboration of mainstream media journalists, advertisers and government and other 
institutions. Government and other organisations like technology companies need to assist in 
digital literacy (Pellotti 2018). Digital literacy is defined as the ability of individuals to find 
and evaluate the veracity of information they find on online spaces. For example, the 
government of Singapore has given financial assistance for the development of a mobile 
application that detects fake news (Tan 2018). Consumer digital literacy should go hand in 
gloves with the programmes that educate news readers how to be good news consumers in this 
environment characterised by fake news. On top of that, we argue that journalism schools 
should start rethinking their curricula. In the era of fake news, a great journalism curriculum 
would include robust discussions of fake news, big data, bots, algorithms and news 
consumption in the contemporary age of multiple news platforms  
The problem with government involvement in matters of communication, media and 
information is trust. Governments are generally, not known for truth-telling 
(Hatzisavvidou 2018). There is a danger that the involvement of government may lead along a 
dangerous road to legal regulation of media, and that government itself may impede fact-based 
accountability if it is allowed to intervene in the matters of news content. Thus, any discussion 
about government intervention in the fight against fake news would lead to enduring debates 
about free speech. Sceptics argue that government involvement would do long term harm by 
bringing back censorship of content. But, it might be important too, to ask if the scourge of 
fake news has not gone too far to necessitate greater involvement of all stakeholders, including 
government, in the fight.  Social networking cites have a role to play, too. Victory against fake 
news on their platforms would, to greater extent, restore their own credibility as news and 
information-sharing sites. The mainstream should continue producing impartial, objective 
news content that is shareable and can also readily go viral to match the speed and extravagance 
of fake news.  That way, the mainstream can seriously start declawing fake news. 
Conclusion 
The fast- moving events of a ‘soft coup’ in Zimbabwe created an information vacuum which 
became fertile ground for the rapid and widespread dissemination of fake news. Journalists, 
whose work has come under increasing attack from purveyors of fake news, had to find a 
response that would help keep their product credible. The task was made the more difficult by 
the air of uncertainty and lack of traditional official sources such as government spokespeople. 
However, the study established that journalists did not go with the flow in spreading unverified 
information. They had to go back to basics of news gathering such as verification of sources, 
difficult as it was. Journalistic capital of important sources was magnified at this time. It was a 
time for demonstration of journalism excellence, hence some journalists became reference 
points for others. Editors had to demonstrate why they were leaders of newsrooms. All editors 
interviewed did this by creating core teams that handled sensitive information to avoid the 
release of any unverified information. This was inspired by both a desire to uphold professional 
excellence and the fear of being found on the wrong side of whoever would emerge as the 
victor from the murky events. There was also a recognition that participation in the 
dissemination of unverified information could attract litigation which would be disastrous for 
newsrooms that are already reeling from a difficult economic environment in the country. The 
study argues that a three-pronged approach is helpful for journalists to avoid falling into the 
trap of fake news. Firstly there is need to strengthen good professional practices such as 
insisting on multiple verification of sources. Secondly, since it is the profession of journalism 
that is under attack from fake news, there is need for more collaboration among newsrooms, 
especially in times of such high uncertainties. Thirdly, there is need for the deepening of 
investigative journalism to unpack with evidence what officials would not ordinarily want 
revealed. This would ensure that where fake news feeds on speculation, professional journalists 
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